

Mozambique political process bulletin

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Three accurate rapid counts

All three rapid counts produced results close to each other for the presidential election.

Radio Mozambique read out results all day on Thursday and had by far the most rapid public count. They were not far from the final results, giving more to Guebuza and less to the other two candidates – perhaps reflecting a slight urban bias. But they were correct on the Guebuza landslide and that Dhlakama would be second and Simango third.

The Electoral Observatory and EISA (Electoral Institute of South Africa) did a statistically accurate sample count. By mid-day Thursday, they, too, had confirmed the shape of the election. The table below gives their estimates.

Finally, STAE and the election authorities themselves did a series of rapid provisional counts, and in the table below we give an early and a late version.

What is striking is that all three gave very similar results and thus the public knew quite quickly the outcome of the election.

	Date	Sample size	Simango	Guebuza	Dhlakama	Turnout
RM	29.10 at 1700	14%	6%	83%	10%	42%*
STAE	29.10 at 2000	19%	8%	77%	15%	42%*
STAE	1.11	89%	9%	76%	15%	39%*
EIObs	29.10 at 1200	5%	10%	75%	15%	43%
EIObs	4.11	7%	8%	74%	17%	44%

* Turnout for RM and STAE is for valid votes only. The Electoral Observatory includes invalid votes as well (nulos and brancos).

Ballot box stuffing in Ilha de Moçambique

In contrast to past years, and to the MDM this year, Renamo is giving the press hard evidence of electoral misconduct. Yesterday's press conference was to show 9 ballot papers, 5 presidential and 4 parliament, all marked for Frelimo, which it reports were taken from someone trying to put extra votes in a ballot box in polling station 541 at EP1, Jembesse, Lumbo on the mainland part of Ilha de Moçambique.

Renamo says that its polling station delegate Bilaly Vuqueque caught a local adult education teacher Sualehe Malda with a set of already marked ballot papers for Frelimo

which he was trying to put into the ballot box. The police were called, but it was Vuqueque who was arrested and Malda was allowed to go free. But Vuqueque was able to keep some of the ballot papers taken from Malda, and those were shown to the press. As far as we can tell, the ballot papers are real. The ballot papers had a range of numbers, but three of the presidential ballots were sequential, with numbers 03889365 to 7.

There have been widespread reports of misconduct on Ilha de Moçambique in this election, including a number of reports of ballot box stuffing.

- One polling station during the afternoon had the door closed, and when the door was opened, it was possible to see polling station staff putting ballots into the box.
- In another polling station, during the count, a member of staff was seen ticking names off in the register book, in order to increase the official number of those who voted, to allow more ballots to be counted.
- In one case, polling station staff counting the vote came across a group of ballots that were still stuck together, as if they had been taken from the book of ballots as a group. Without comment, the polling station president separated the ballot papers, then counted them.

Several polling stations were seen with Frelimo party delegates instead of polling station staff controlling the door, and deciding who was allowed in to vote.

And there are a number of reports of apparently intentional confusion being created in queues, and especially of older people (believed to be more likely to vote Renamo) being pushed out of queues and sent home.

The reports of misconduct on Ilha de Moçambique in this election are very similar to the widespread misconduct there in local elections last year. For example, EP1 Jembesse was a particular problem also in local elections last year, and there was strong evidence of both ballot box stuffing and improperly nullifying votes for Renamo.

For a detailed report on misconduct on Ilha de Moçambique in 2008 local elections, see pages 8-10 of *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin* 37a of 15 December 2008, posted on <http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/p3.shtml> and attached to this bulletin as posted on our website www.elections2009.cip.org.mz

Daviz wins Beira

Beira mayor Daviz Simango, leader of the MDM, won a majority of presidential votes in the city. The results were:

Daviz Simango (MDM):	59,548 (51%)
Armando Guebuza (Frelimo):	49,553 (42%)
Afonso Dhlakama (Renamo):	7,789 (7%)

Parliamentary election

MDM:	55,455 (48%)
Frelimo:	49,150 (42%)
Renamo:	7,786 (7%)

Turnout was 46%.

Electoral reform high on the donor agenda

Some donors will bring strong pressure for a complete reform of the electoral process in the coming months. This may include token cuts in budget support.

A key group of donors feel that the process which led to the MDM not being allowed to stand in many provinces was unfair, and that new entrants such as MDM were placed at

too great a disadvantage. Some also feel that the National Elections Commission is not neutral.

For these donors, the issue is not the narrow one of whether the MDM submitted files or not. Rather it is a combination of factors which these donors argue made the entire pre-election process unfair. The electoral laws themselves are confused and contradictory, which means that decisions rest on interpretation and choices as to which part of laws are to be applied. The National Elections Commission (CNE) itself was secretive and chaotic, failing to follow its own schedules, failing to create clear procedures, and issuing incorrect and contradictory documents and instructions. Thus the process rested on the integrity and competence of the CNE; some donors argue that key figures in the CNE who are known to be sympathetic to Frelimo were selected by a less than transparent process, and have not earned the trust required. The final straw was the Constitutional Council decision, which was based on a secret CNE document that no one outside has ever seen, and which is contradicted by other CNE documents. Taken together, then, for these donors the whole pre-election process was unacceptable and unfair.

There has clearly been a change in mood in the donor community. One ambassador commented: "Donors were more forgiving with the 2004 elections. But now we are applying higher standards. We had expected improvements, particularly more transparency, which did not happen."

Part of the change in climate is coming from donor capitals, particularly in northern Europe, where aid agency officials and ministers are saying the elections were not acceptable. This is a pressure from capitals not felt before on this issue.

Indeed, the lack of priority given to the electoral process in the past is shown by the fact that elections are not one of the performance indicators agreed by the government and the G19 budget support donors. But this is changing. In the next round of discussions, some G19 members will insist on an electoral reform benchmark being added to the performance indicators.

At least one donor, and perhaps several, seem likely to make token cuts in budget support. They will not reduce total aid, but as a sign of discontent will move aid from budget support to projects.

Several donors argue that the G19 must react, especially on the lack of transparency of the CNE – to not respond strongly would be seen as complete acceptance, as happened in 2004.

A few donors are concerned about the overwhelming power of Frelimo, and point to what they see as difficulties put in the path of MDM which were totally unnecessary when Frelimo was on the road to such a huge victory. They fear there is a danger of a one-party state and that the international community has a responsibility to encourage checks and balances and promote the creation of more space for new entrants. An active opposition is needed to keep the dominant party responsive and in touch with the voters.

Meanwhile, the G19 faces its own north-south division, as noted below, and the donors will be anxious to keep the group together. Frelimo, too, is likely to be divided on how to respond. Just as the hard-line donors are demanding electoral reform, some hard-liners in Frelimo will want to use this election victory as a platform to take a firm stand against the donors.

Some difficult negotiations are in prospect, both within the G19 and Frelimo, and between them.

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Divisions between donors, with observers caught in middle

G19 budget support donors are divided. In general the northern Europeans are taking a harder line on these elections, while the southern Europeans – Spain, Portugal and Italy –

are more supportive of Frelimo. This has also made election observation more politicised than in past elections.

The more political observation groups, such as the CPLP (Comunidade dos Países da Língua Portuguesa), have praised Mozambique by putting stress on the impressive organisation and conduct of election day. In contrast, the more professional and experienced observer teams – European Union, EISA and Commonwealth – have praised polling day but have been more critical about the pre-election period.

The EU observer mission was caught in the middle. The G19 budget support group in September had taken a very strong position against the exclusion of the MDM, issuing a statement on 17 September and successfully demanding urgent meetings with President Armando Guebuza and CNE President João Leopoldo da Costa. These donors looked to the EU observers for support.

On Thursday, the day after the election, the EU observer mission leadership came under pressure for two sides during the drafting of the interim statement. On one side, the group of members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in the observation team, a majority of whom were Portuguese, wanted the statement to give high praise for the election.

On the other side, European heads of mission plus Norway, Switzerland and Canada met with the observer team leaders in a meeting which sometimes became angry, with some northern European ambassadors saying that the EU observers were being too soft on the CNE and on the exclusion of the MDM.

The EU observer leaders tried to keep to a narrow technical line, saying it was not their role to make political judgements. Words were moved around and titles changed enough to mollify both sides. But the MEPs went on to issue their own statement of praise, while some northern European ambassadors still find the EU interim statement unacceptably weak.

But the EU observers interim statement did satisfy two key needs of the more hard line donors. First, some of the G19 feel very exposed after their possibly too strong statement on the exclusion of the MDM in September. But the EU observer statement is critical of that early process, which they feel supports them enough.

Second, in order for individual donors to reduce budget support without the whole G19 doing so, a donor must say that it considered there to have been a breach of the democracy section of the Memorandum of Understanding. Those donors were anxious that praise should be limited and criticism strong enough to allow them to do this. On this, they are satisfied.

But perhaps for the first time in Mozambique, observer declarations are likely to be taken into account in decisions about aid, both in Maputo and in donor capitals.

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